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 Latin America was the world’s pioneering nation in the privatization of pensions. In 
1981, Chile’s pension system underwent a reform making it the first country to replace a public 
defined-benefit pay-as-you-go pension scheme with a fully funded defined-contribution pension 
scheme based on individual accounts. This project assesses the impacts and results of pension 
privatization in Chile, Mexico and Uruguay. As indicators of a prosperous system, my analyses 
are made using the six core guiding principles of Social Security: i) Coverage; ii) Equal 
Treatment and Social Solidarity; iii) Gender Equity; iv) Adequacy of Benefits; v) Administrative 
Costs; vi) and, Financial Sustainability1. This project uses historical data from the three 
countries, including periods before the reform, in order to adequately compare the two systems 
and determine which has proven to be more efficient. The main findings of this paper are the 
positive impacts associated with pensions privatization with respect to the six core guiding 
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Introduction and Methodology 
 
Pension systems in Latin America have been evolving since 1981, when Chile guided 
the movement towards pension privatization, replacing its public defined-benefit pay-as-you-go 
system with a fully funded, defined-contribution system of individual accounts. Since then, 
several countries have followed in Chile’s footsteps, either replacing their existent public 
pension schemes entirely or incorporating aspects of privatization through reforms. Among these 
countries are Mexico and Uruguay. In 1997, Mexico reformed its pension system, replacing its 
previous pay-as-you-go scheme with a system based on individual accounts. This new system 
shifted the burden of funding workers’ retirements from the collective population to the 
individual worker. In 1995, Uruguay transformed its pension system from a public pay-as-you-
go scheme to a multi-pillar system composed of a public pillar and a private pillar of individual 
accounts. This paper sets out to measure the impacts and effectiveness of the Chilean, Mexican 
and Uruguayan pension reforms based on the six core guiding principles of Social Security: i) 
Coverage; ii) Equal Treatment and Social Solidarity; iii) Gender Equity; iv) Adequacy of 
Benefits; v) Administrative Costs; vi) and, Financial Sustainability2. 
In my project, the social security guiding principles are incorporated in the following 
ways. Coverage is measured by the percentage of the labor force and/or percentage of the total 
population contributing (either actively contributing or affiliated) towards a pension. This 
measurement demonstrates what proportion of the labor force or population will become eligible 
for a pension once they reach the age of retirement. An additional measure of coverage is the 
proportion of the elderly population (65 years old and above) that is currently receiving pensions. 
                                                     
2 Mesa-Lago, Reassembling Social Security: A Survey of Pensions and Health Care Reforms in Latin America, 2008 
 2 
This measurement gives us insight on the effectiveness of the program by looking specifically at 
the demographic it targets. Equal treatment is measured by comparing benefits across different 
occupational groups to determine whether there are any inconsistencies in these findings that 
point to a particularly favored group. Social solidarity is measured by the availability of social 
programs targeting people who cannot or do not contribute to a pension throughout their lives, 
falling below government-mandated requirements for pension eligibility by the time they reach 
the age of retirement (typically attributable to women, low-income earners or informal-sector 
workers). An additional measure of social solidarity is the percentage of the total elderly 
population benefiting from such programs. Gender equity determines discrepancies between 
male and female contributors and beneficiaries of the system. It is measured first by 
understanding the labor participation rates of both male and female workers which provides 
insight when calculating the percent of contributions and pensioners by sex. Adequacy of 
benefits are determined by comparing the pre- and post-reform benefits offered by the different 
systems and determining whether these benefits have improved in the long-run. Administrative 
costs, the fees imposed by private pension fund management companies on workers, show what 
percentage of a worker’s salary will be deducted in exchange for the services provided by these 
companies. Financial sustainability is indicated by the diversity of investment portfolios of these 
private pension fund management companies and their annual real net returns, in order to ensure 














































 In 1981, Chile replaced its public, defined-benefit pay-as-you-go pension scheme with a 
pension system based on Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). This shift towards 
privatization, notably the first of its kind, subsequently served as the pioneering model for other 
Latin American countries. In the 1990s through the 2000s, what became known as the “Chilean 
Model”, had noticeably influenced other countries in the Latin America region to make similar 
shifts toward privatization. Although Chile served as the inspiring force behind these 
movements, not all countries made complete transitions. In some cases, IRAs were added to the 
pre-existing pay-as-you-go schemes, transforming these pension systems into multi-pillar 
schemes composed of both a public and private system. To understand the motivation and effects 
of similar reforms in other Latin American countries, it is important to first look at Chile, as this 
model paved the way toward the evolution of pension systems throughout Latin America, and 
drew the attention of the entire world while doing so. 
 
The Structure of the Pre-Reform Chilean Pension System 
In the 1920s, Chile’s social security system came to fruition. This system was composed 
of several social benefits, including financial security for older retired workers by way of post-
retirement income; old-age pensions. Since the system’s inception, there were clear distinctions 
between retirement benefits given to white collar versus blue collar workers (Mesa-Lago, 2011). 
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As time passed, social pressures rose from different professional groups and a variety of 
pension funds began to emerge, individualizing benefits based on pensioner’s sector of work. 
This gave rise to the formation of several cajas, or public pension funds. By 1979, there were 3 
major pension funds in Chile (defined by the amount of contributors and the net fund balances 
within them) however, there were 32 total cajas in operation. The three major cajas that made up 
94% of all contributions were the Servicio de Seguro Social (SSS), which consisted primarily of 
blue-collar workers, the Caja de Prevision de Empleados Particulares (EMPART) and the Caja 
Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Periodistas (CANAEMPU), a fund catered to public 
employees and journalists (Cerda, 2008). 
These different cajas were created in order to distribute benefits to specific occupational 
groups. For example, one caja would cover fishermen, another would cover lawyers, another 
would cover writers etc. This growth in individualized pension funds meant greater disparities 
and growing inequalities between the benefits received by workers. Although different pension 
funds were made to target different workers, all pensions operated under the public pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) system. A PAYG pension scheme is one in which you make monthly contributions 
that are deducted from your paycheck towards your retirement. The contributions made by 
current participants, fund the retirement of past participants of the program. In Chile, the PAYG 
system was public and associated with public finances through portfolio management. 
The push to use the PAYG system’s surplus on the improvement of benefits was inspired 
by the people’s desires to create more social assistance programs like maternity subsidies and 
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overall increases in the real value of pensions (Ibid.). Before the reform of 1981, a large portion 
of individuals contributing to a caja were eligible to receive retirement benefits with a minimum 
contribution of 35 years, this meant that if you started contributing at 18 years old and continued 
your contributions for 35 years, you could receive benefits as early as 53 years of age. Without 
the implementation of a strict retirement age, pressures on fiscal expenditure increased since a 
person could retire at a relatively young age and be eligible to receive benefits until their death, 
so long as they met the contribution requirement of 35 years. 
In conclusion, the pre-reform pension scheme was organized in a way that propagated 
inequality between beneficiaries. The existence of many different cajas meant inconsistent 
retirement income and consequent disparities in the standards of living among the retired and 
elderly population. The redistributive aspect of the system would begin to be a problem as the 
system worried about an ageing population which could result in fewer current contributors 
funding the retirement of many current retirees (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
 




(Table 2. Source: World Bank) 
 
Growing Problems with the PAYG System 
 Throughout the first few decades of the PAYG system, the ratio of many contributors to 
few beneficiaries generated a surplus within the system. These results led to an optimistic 
mentality about the system, which ultimately led to the reallocation of the system’s surplus 
towards the improvement of benefits offered to its beneficiaries. These improved benefits 
however, would be unsustainable as the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries would change; in 
1955 there were 12.2 contributors for every pensioner whereas by 1980 this figure fell to 2.5 
contributors for every pensioner (OECD, 1998). 
In response to the shift from the system’s surplus to its deficit, the government decided to 
increase contribution rates. Additionally, the fact that the system had set a legal minimum 
contribution created more problems. As time passed, contributors began to contribute only the 
minimum indicated by the system and eventually, many workers began to evade their social 
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security contributions entirely. Besides that, the steep increase in unemployment rates between 
1972 and 1975, wherein the rates were 3.3% and 14.9% respectively, contributed to the declining 
participation in the system (Ibid.). Due to these problems that created possibilities for 
contributors to contribute as little as possible or nothing at all, as the program’s deficit grew, 
contribution rates had to grow simultaneously. 
 
Preparing for the Reform 
 In 1973, 79% of all formal-sector workers were contributing to the pension system, the 
highest coverage rate in Chile’s pension system history. However, this coverage rate would go 
down as the country executed a strict fiscal plan in order to finance the privatization of its public 
pension system. The Chilean government decided to finance this shift by reducing public 
spending, increasing contribution rates and increasing the retirement age by five years for both 
male and female employees (making the age of eligibility for retirement 60 for women and 65 
for men) (Gil et al., 2005). This motivation came from the need to generate enough funds to pay 
out the last generation of contributors affiliated with the PAYG program that would be carried 
over to the new system. In 1974, the program’s contribution rate peaked at 50% of the 
contributor’s salary. Even though the contribution rate went down (33.5% being the lowest 
contribution rate between 1974 and 1980) from that point until 1980, these high percentages 
created more incentive for people to decrease or evade their contributions. The Chilean 
government’s plan to increase contribution rates in order to fund the privatization of the new 
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system to pay-out the last generation of PAYG participants backlashed as overall coverage rates 
decreased.   
Reasons for the Reform and The Chicago Boys 
 The Chicago Boys were a group of Chilean economists who studied under Milton 
Friedman and Arnold Harberger during the 1950s to the early 1970s. These boys received their 
economic training at the University of Chicago, funded by the U.S. government, who initiated 
this program in 1950 as a way of influencing economic thought in Chile. These boys returned to 
Chile with economic values grounded in Friedman’s monetarist approach. They effectively 
spread these monetarist economic values, including deregulation and large-scale privatization, 
under Pinochet’s dictatorship, when they were afforded the power to do. Ultimately, it was this 
new wave of economic thought, spurred by the return of the Chicago Boys, that guided the 
privatization of pensions in Chile (Undurraga, 2015). 
A principle reason for the reform of 1981 was the growing concern of shifting 
demographics that would create a financial burden on future generations supporting past 
generations. The main concern with this is having a disproportionately small labor force funding 
the retirement of a much larger retired generation. The hope for the transition towards individual 
accounts was to exterminate the deficits of the public system in the long run. Of course, the cost 
of the transition was considered to delay the positive impacts of the new private system as the 
government had to recognize contributors of the past PAYG system by paying them recognition 
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bonds. These recognition payments would have to continue until the last person who had 
contributed to the PAYG system retired. While the option for past PAYG contributors to 
continue contributing to the PAYG program remained after the reform, the Chilean government 
decreased the incentive to do so by making the contribution rates of the individual accounts (IAs) 
lower (17% in its introduction year) than the contribution rate of the PAYG scheme. 
Approximately 75% of workers affiliated with the PAYG by 1981 decided to immediately 
transfer to the new IA system upon its introduction (Bertranou et al., 2005). 
 
The Structural Reform of Chile’s Pension System: How the New System Worked   
 As of 1981, the Chilean pension system was composed of three tiers: a poverty 
prevention tier, an individual account tier, and a voluntary savings tier (Table 3). The first tier of 
the new system, known as the poverty prevention tier, was meant to provide basic social 
assistance to elderly people who had not participated in the PAYG system, and to retired people 
whose accumulated contributions to the system did not meet a certain minimum by the time they 
reached the age of retirement. The second tier of individual accounts, was mandatory for every 
formal sector employee. Contribution rates were 10% of worker’s monthly salaries. The third 
tier, voluntary savings, was a motivational tier for workers to accumulate additional savings, in 
addition to their contributions towards an individual account (Kritzer et al., 2011). 
The mandatory 10% contributions made by workers under the second tier go to one 
private pension fund management company of their choice. These companies are called 
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Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) or Pension Fund Administrators. These AFPs 
function like mutual funds and invest participant’s contributions in securities like government or 
corporate bonds. The pension system is regulated by the government-run institution called the 
Superintendencia de Pensiones, the Superintendency of Pensions, that is in charge of supervising 
the system, ensuring the compliance of AFPs to certain investment rules (diversification and 
reduced risk) and protecting contributor’s rights (Wiatrowski, 1998). 
While formal sector employees are required to contribute 10% of their salaries to an AFP, 
independent workers’ participation is voluntary. Second tier contributors pay two premiums, set 
competitively between AFPs, in addition to their monthly contributions; one is the AFP’s 
administrative cost and the second is a disability and survivor insurance. The average sum cost of 
these two premiums is approximately 3% of the contributor’s salary (Rofman et al., 2008). 
Therefore, a contributor’s total contribution comes out to be roughly 13% of their monthly 
salary, a rate that is much lower than the past rates of the PAYG system. 
Pension fund administrators have a range of functions; not only do they manage a 
contributor’s funds by investing them in a variety of assets but they also provide and distribute 
particular retirement benefits. A contributor is allowed to switch between AFPs up to six times a 
year if they are unhappy with their returns or the premiums they are paying (Ibid.). Unlike the 
PAYG system, the contributions made by participants to an AFP go directly into their individual 
accounts, where the money is managed until the contributor reaches the age of retirement, 
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becoming eligible to accept their retirement income and benefits. This new structure of pension 
system weeded out the redistributive features of the previous public system. 
 
 





Upon reaching the age of retirement, 60 years old for women and 65 for men, a 
contributor is faced with four options. The first, is the option to purchase a pension annuity from 
a private insurance company (Barrientos, 1997). If the pensioner chooses this option, they 
receive fixed annual payments funded by the accumulated funds and returns on their past 
contributions. This option cannot be changed once chosen and in the case of a pensioner’s death, 
whatever funds are leftover do not go to the dependants of the deceased (OECD, 1998). The 
second option a pensioner faces is to set up programmed withdrawals. In this case, the funds 
within a pensioner’s account continue to earn returns as they receive retirement income and in 
the event of a pensioner’s death, the remaining funds within the individual account go to the 
deceased’s estate and dependents. The other two options were introduced later on and are 
explained in (Table 3).   
 
The Government’s Role in the Introduction of the Private System 
Although the successful execution of the new scheme depended in part on competition 
between AFPs, government guarantees and regulations allowed the system to prosper. The 
imposition of government regulation during the pension system’s transitional period helped 
establish the new private scheme at the time of its introduction. 
While AFPs have a range of investment and management strategies, the government 
closely regulated the companies by supervising the AFPs “as regards their financial health, 
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investment portfolio, commission charges, and information flows to affiliates.” (Barrientos, 
1997). Additionally, the government made guarantees to contributors in order to ensure security 
within the system. The three main guarantees included: i) a minimum pension guarantee for 
contributors that have met the minimum contributory requirements but whose accumulated funds 
are less than the minimum pension by the time they reach retirement; ii) the guarantee of a 
pension annuity plan in the event that an insurance company that had setup programmed 
withdrawals with a beneficiary fails to properly deliver its services; iii) no taxation on 
contributions or returns within an individual account until the withdrawal period (Rofman and 
Oliveri, 2012). 
After the period of record-high contribution rates in the 1970s, meant to fund the 
transition between the public and private system, the government decided to decrease these rates 
at the introduction of the new system in order to create greater incentive for workers to 
contribute. These lowered rates were set out to increase coverage amongst formal-sector workers 
in Chile, and would be funded by the additional five years of contribution workers would make 
due to the increased age of retirement. 
Finally, in order to recognize the contributions that workers made to the PAYG pension 
scheme, government-issued “recognition bonds” were allocated in the accounts of past 




The Re-Reform of 2008 and Other Changes to the 1981 Pension Structure 
In 2008, the Chilean pension system underwent another reform. The main purpose of this 
additional reform was to increase coverage rates, reduce the administrative costs charged by 
AFPs and to reinforce the first poverty prevention tier (Shelton, 2012). The re-reform went about 
strengthening the poverty prevention tier by introducing a basic non-contributory welfare 
pension (Basic Solidarity Pension or PBS) that would be financed by the national budget (Ibid.).   
At the start of the individual account pension system, there was only one kind of fund in 
which contributors could make their monthly retirement payments. This characteristic of the 
second tier meant that a contributor’s level of risk-aversion was not considered with regards to 
the management of their accounts. In other words, the management of each affiliate’s account 
was not individualized based on their age, wealth and degree of risk aversion. The initial 
structure of AFPs made average investments of 72.46% in fixed income and 27.45% in equity as 
of December 1997, yielding a real average annual net return of -1.14% in 1998 (Mesa-Lago 
2009). This kind of return sparked the need for funds with different levels of distribution across 
equity and fixed income investments. Thus in October 1999, Fund E was introduced. This fund, 
concentrating its investments entirely on fixed income, catered to people who were approaching 
the retirement age and could not risk the possibility of incurred losses on risky investments. In 
2002, three more funds A, B and D were introduced into the system. These funds are 
distinguishable by their minimum and maximum levels of investment in equity instruments; A is 
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the riskiest fund, B is less risky, C (the original fund) sits between risky and safe, D is 
conservative and E is the most conservative of all five (Ibid.). 
 If you are close to the age of retirement, you are not allowed to be contributing to Fund 
A. This rule is enforced 10 years before the age of retirement. Therefore, if you are a 50 year old 
woman or 55 year old man, you can no longer transfer the funds of your individual account to 
Fund A. If you had been a contributor to Fund A, by the time you reach 50 years old for a 
woman or 55 for a man, your account funds will be automatically transferred to Fund B at a rate 
of 20% per year until no funds remain in Fund A (Hormazábal, 2010). The explanation for such 
strict limitations unto older participants stems from the state’s concern in limiting public 
spending. If a person close to the age of retirement allocated his contributions in Fund A and 
incurred losses in response to the high level of equity investments, the state would have to 
increase public spending on the welfare pension program (Ibid.). 














 Measuring coverage is a way of measuring how many workers in the formal labor sector 
are contributing to the existent social security system. Additionally, this measurement is telling 
of how many people will be covered by the social security system, in this case, old-age pensions, 
by the time they reach the age of retirement. 
The difference between affiliates and contributors to the Chilean pension system, lies in 
that affiliates have a retirement fund managed by an AFP, but may not be currently employed or 
currently contributing to their fund. Meanwhile, contributors are members of the workforce who 
are currently and actively contributing to their pension funds. 
The Chilean rate of coverage reached an all-time high in 1973 of 79%. Between 1973 and 
the reform of 1981, the lowest coverage rate was 33.5%. This could be attributed to the increased 
contribution rates mandated by the state to finance the transition from the public PAYG system 
to the private fund system. By 1982, one year after the introduction of the privatized pension 
scheme, the percentage of contributors was 29% while the percentage of affiliates was 39% 
(Table 4). Although these rates are impressively lower than the 79% seen in 1973, both of these 
rates would steadily increase from 1982 onward. The coverage rate represented by affiliates 
increased quickly after the reform of 1981. By 1984, the rate of affiliates as a percentage of the 
workforce had increased by 12 percentage points to 51% from the preceding year’s rate of 39%. 
Ten years later, the rate of affiliates of the pension system doubled to 102% of the workforce, 
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demonstrating that even people that have been unemployed for long enough to not be considered 
participants of the labor force had a retirement fund. 
The coverage rate measured by active contributors as a percentage of the workforce, 
increased simultaneously although not as drastically. In 1982, one year after the reform, the rate 
of contributors as a percentage of the workforce was 29%. By 1985, the rate of contributors 
increased by 10 percentage points to 39%. Between 1982 and 2016, there has been an overall 
average increase in the percentage of the workforce that contributes to an AFP of 2 percentage 
points, reaching 64% in 2016. 
The rate of contributors declined by 5 percentage points from 2003 to 2004, where it 
dropped from 56% to 51% respectively. By 2005 however, the rate of contributors increased to 
60% but declined again in 2006 to 56%. These declines in the rate of contributors were 
coincidental with times of high rates of unemployment (Table 5). Between 1986 and 2017 the 
average rate of unemployment was 8.16% however the rates of unemployment were above the 
three-decade long average in 2003, 2004 and 2005 when the rates were 9.54%, 10.01% and 9.4% 
respectively. 
 With the strengthening of the poverty prevention tier in 2008, expanding coverage to 
those who were not eligible for basic retirement benefits, and the new requirement as of 2012, 
for all self-employed workers to contribute to an AFP, the rate of contributors increased to 
62.9% by 2013. 
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 Coverage, in terms of affiliates and contributors as a percentage of the labor force, has 
increased substantially since the reform of 1981, however, there are still ways in which to 
improve coverage of the elderly population in Chile. In a report released in September of 2015 
by the Chilean Presidential Commission, they mention the need to expand eligibility of the Basic 
Solidarity Pension (PBS) from the current rate of 60% to 80% of the most impoverished 
households in the country upon passing a means test. Expanding access to the PBS will increase 
coverage among workers that may not have passed the means test when the benchmark for 
eligibility had been drawn at 60% of the most impoverished households. Increasing this 
benchmark to 80% will cover many more individuals that would not have been eligible for the 
Basic Solidarity Pension. (Mesa-Lago, 2009) By imposing fines on self-employed workers and 
formal-sector-employed workers that are evading contributions altogether, coverage may 
increase as both self-employed and regular formally-employed workers will be less inclined to 
accumulate evasion fees (Ibid.).   
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(Table 4. Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones) 
 




Equal Treatment and Social Solidarity 
 While equal treatment is a foundational aspect of a successful social security system, 
Chile’s system has failed to comply with this guiding principle since its reform in 1981. It is 
critical to offer standardized benefits to all workers, even those in powerful occupations, with the 
exception of workers engaged in abnormally physically-demanding or dangerous jobs. 
The military government that implemented the original pension reform in 1981, was able 
to weed out a lot of inequality within the system. Given that prior to 1981, benefits and 
contribution rates were individualized based on a worker’s occupation. However, the 1981 
reform which brought together all programs catering to specific occupational groups, formed one 
system of privatized accounts which failed to include the police and armed forces. These two 
groups continue to receive individualized treatment with better conditions of eligibility and 
superior benefits to other workers. 90% of these superior benefits and superior conditions of 
eligibility are state-financed. The subsidy these particular occupational groups cost the country is 
0.9% of its annual GDP, almost double the state’s spending on the re-reforms of 2008-2012. 
(Mesa-Lago 2016). Although these two occupational groups continue to receive greater state-
subsidized pensions, they are justified given the risk of their jobs.     
 Social solidarity is difficult to attain in a privatized pension system. In 2001, the 
International Law Commission stated: “In pension systems with defined benefits based on pay-
as-you-go (PAYG), the risk is collectively assumed but in systems of individual saving accounts 
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(fully funded), persons assume the risk. While this option exists, it should not weaken solidarity 
systems which spread risks throughout all members” (ILO, 2001). 
In the re-reform of 2008, the state added two state-funded programs that would increase 
social solidarity to the new system of individual retirement accounts. These programs included 
the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS), for people who were not a part of the top 40% income-
earners in the country and who passed a means test, and the second was the Basic Solidarity 
Complement, for individuals who had contributed to an individual account their whole lives but 
did not reach the minimum monthly retirement income of $523 (2016 U.S. dollars) by the age of 
retirement (Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, 2016). It is predominantly the PBS program that 
influenced the increase in coverage over the elderly population (seen in the graph of coverage for 
the elderly population 65+) Both of these programs have boosted social solidarity within the 
system and the potential expansion of the PBS program’s conditions of eligibility will continue 
to expand coverage.   
Gender Equity 
 Gender equality is essential in the labor market in order to obtain equal levels of coverage 
amongst male and female workers. This means hiring as many female workers as male workers 
and paying equal salaries. If there are more male workers than female workers in the formal 
labor sector, it will be impossible to cover them both at a similar rate. 
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 In 2003, there were both low rates of female AFP contributors as a percentage of total 
AFP contributors, 32.8%, and low rates of females in the labor force as a percentage of the total 
labor force, 36.35% (see Table 6 and 7). The female composition of the Chilean labor force has 
grown since 2003, reaching its highest point of 40% in 2015, but has fluctuated between the 
years. From 2003 to 2005, the rate of females in the total labor force increased to 38.7%. By 
2006, however, it declined to 35%, where it remained relatively consistent until 2008, at which 
point it began to increase again, reaching 40% by 2009. This rate declined to 38% in 2010, and 
has increased slightly, but consistently ever since. The rate of female AFP contributors on the 
other hand, has increased relatively consistently since 2003, with minor fluctuations between 
2004 and 2008. It reached its highest rate in 2016, of 39%. 
The reform of 1981 did not help the coverage rates of women in the labor market. Firstly, 
there were no incentives put in place to increase female participation in the labor force, which is 
critical to qualify for the types of benefits offered by the system’s second tier. Secondly, it did 
not offer benefit programs targeting women specifically. The re-reform of 2008, did however, 
include the addition of a maternity voucher, the first kind of benefit to explicitly cater to women. 
This maternity voucher would be deposited into a woman’s individual account upon the birth of 
a child (one voucher per child born alive). This voucher collects annual returns and becomes 
effective upon the retirement of the voucher holder (Ibid.). In addition to this added benefit, by 
2008, housewives became eligible to voluntarily open individual accounts in which their income-
earning partners would contribute on their behalves. The premium and disability insurance 
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premium became identical for both men and women. Both of these added benefits had positive 
effects on the coverage of female workers in the workforce, as the rates of female contributors 
from 2003 to 2008, which had consistently fluctuated between 32% and 35%, began to increase 
steadily from 2008 through 2016. 
The number of female beneficiaries increased from 162,287 in 2004 to 769,402 in 2017 
(Table 8). While the amount of male beneficiaries was 365,544 in 2004 and 740,110 in 2017. 
While the amount of beneficiaries increased for women and men during this time period, it 
increased significantly for women. Presently, the amount of retired women receiving pensions 
exceeds the amount of men receiving pensions, which could be attributable to the average female 
life expectancy exceeded the average male life expectancy by seven years. 
  
(Table 6. Source: World Bank, Superintendencia de Pensiones) 
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(Table 7. Source: World Bank) 
 
(Table 8. Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones) 
Adequacy of Benefits 
 Prior to the reform of 1981, there existed a non-contributory pension program called 
PASIS, for which eligibility was determined by a means-test. While this program continued after 
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the 1981 reform, a cap on the number of beneficiaries was put in place, creating long waiting 
lists, and entry became subject to the availability of fiscal funds (Ibid.). The reform of 1981, 
increased by 20 years, the number of mandatory years of contribution needed to become eligible 
for a minimum pension, for all participants of the previous public system. However, a minimum 
pension was guaranteed to people in the private system who met the necessary amount of 
contributory years but still lacked the financing at the time they reached retirement (Kritzer et al., 
2011). 
 The introduction of the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS) and the Basic Solidarity 
Complement (APS) in the re-reform of 2008, were beneficial for affiliates who not only did not 
qualify for the minimum pension but also did not qualify for the non-contributory pension 
offered by PASIS. The minimum pension guarantee was equal to approximately 62% of 
minimum wage income in 2007. By 2015, the average monthly Basic Solidarity pension 
(adjusted annually to the CPI) for old-age beneficiaries was approximately $132 which was more 
than 50% higher than the minimum pension offered by PASIS (Mesa Lago, 2016). The amount 
of annual benefits paid out to beneficiaries since the inception of the PBS and APS programs 
have increased since 2008, with greater increases from the APS program (Table 9).   
 Since 2008, the year that the Basic Solidarity Pension was introduced, to 2017, the 
number of total old-age beneficiaries of the program increased from 358,445 to 399,317 
respectively (Superintendencia de Pensiones, 2017). While the amount of female beneficiaries 
increased within this time period, from 244,815 in 2008 to 291,749 in 2017, the number of male 
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beneficiaries actually decreased from 113,630 in 2008 to 107,568 in 2017 (Table 10). This 
program predominantly benefits the old-age pension income of women. 
The Basic Solidarity Complement, on the other hand, increased substantially from 
237,978 total beneficiaries in 2009 to 754,760 in 2017 (Table 11). While the number of female 
and male beneficiaries increase at a similar rate from the 2009 to 2017 period, females are the 
main beneficiaries of this program as well. In 2009, there were 137,544 female beneficiaries 
compared to 100,434 males. In August of 2017, there were 436,895 females receiving this 
supplemental pension, and 317,865 males. Elderly poverty decreased by 2.7 percentage points 
from 2008 to 2015. (Mesa Lago, 2016) 
 The OECD and ILO placed a minimum pension replacement rate of 45%, based on the 
insured person's average salary. This means that a pensioner’s retirement income should be at 
least 45% of their average salary throughout the contributory period of their lives. CASP (The 
Presidential Advisory Commision on the Pension System, 2016) found that the average 
replacement rate of pensioners was below this minimum. They found that using the median 
replacement rate of pension replacement rates was more instructive than the average as there 
were huge disparities between pensioners. CASP found that median replacement rates for men 
was 48% while it was 24% for women, yielding a total median replacement rate of 34% for the 
time period of 2007 to 2014. The introduction of the Basic Solidarity Complement in 2008 
increased the total median replacement rate to 45% by 2014 (Superintendencia de Pensiones, 
2015). 
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Overall, the adequacy of benefits matters most for people that may not be able to fund 
their own retirement. For this reason, the introduction of the Basic Solidarity Pension and the 
Basic Solidarity Complement were critical additions to the post-reform Chilean pension system. 
The increases in benefits, in terms of the real amount of annual payments distributed by these 
programs, far exceed the income distributed by the PASIS program. Overall, the introduction of 
these social assistance programs, has contributed to the decline in elderly poverty. These 
programs stress the importance of the state in expanding coverage and improving elderly 
standards of living. 
 
(Table 9. Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones) 
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(Table 10. Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones) 
 
(Table 11. Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones) 
Administrative Costs 
 In 1981, there were 12 total AFPs in operation. This number rose to 21 by 1994, and then 
declined to 6 in 2011 (Boletín, 2017). Principal motivations for the reform of 2008 were to 
reduce administrative costs, make the fee structure more comprehensible for workers choosing 
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between AFPs and to increase competition. The latter was accomplished by introducing a 
biennial bidding process. As of 2008, AFPs would enter a bidding process occurring every other 
year, wherein the AFP with the lowest administrative cost would be chosen as the fund manager 
for all new workers entering the labor force that year. It was mandatory for these new 
participants to remain in whatever AFP they were placed into for a minimum of 2 years, after 
this period, the contributor could move their accumulated funds to an AFP of their choosing 
(Boletín, 2017). 
 AFPs’ costs of marketing and sales had a big impact on the determination of 
administrative costs during the first years of the new pension system. In the 1990’s it was 
estimated that marketing and sales costs composed more than one third of AFP total costs. The 
growth of the AFP sales force during this time period is also worth noting. Between 1990 and 
1995, the AFP sales force more than quadrupled in size, going from 3,500 in 1990 to 15,000 in 
1995 (Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, 2016). The salespeople working for AFPs concentrate mostly 
on transferring people from one AFP to another. Taking this into consideration, restricting the 
number of times contributors transfer AFPs effects decreases in administrative costs. However, 
severely limiting the number of times contributors can make these transfers might risk 
competition across AFPs. 
 While average administrative costs went up drastically in the initial years of the structural 
reform, they steadily declined. Administrative costs reached their peaks in 1984 when the 
average administrative cost of AFPs was 8.69% of taxable income (Table 12). By 1988, average 
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administrative costs began to decline. During the twenty-year period of 1990-2010, average AFP 
administrative costs stayed around 3%. By 2014, average administrative costs were down to 
2.4% of taxable income. Lowering this cost even further continues to be an objective of the 
Chilean pension system. 
 
(Table 12. Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones) 
Financial Sustainability 
 The structural reform of the Chilean pension system shifted the financial responsibility 
from the employers’ and the state in the public scheme, to the contributors in the individual 
accounts scheme. 
 The real annual rate of return of the system was highest in 1982, reaching a rate of 
28.5%. By 1984, this rate dropped to 3.5%. Increasing again in 1999 to 16.3% (Table 13). The 
real annual return rates of the system fluctuate substantially during the period spanning from 
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1982 to 2014. In 2008, the pension system saw its first negative return rate at -18.9%, 
attributable to the global financial crisis. 
 Although the real annual return rates of the pension system fluctuated substantially 
between 1982 and 2014, the accumulated capital of the system as a percentage of GDP increased 
steadily, from 2000 to 2014, with certain annual exceptions. In 2014, the accumulated capital of 
the individual account funds was its highest in terms of real value and as a percentage of GDP; 
$165.4 billion U.S. dollars and 69.5% of Chile’s GDP for that year. The individual account funds 
were at their lowest percentage of GDP in 2008: 52.8% (Superintendencia de Pensiones). From 
2009 to 2014, the accumulated capital in the private pension system in addition to its portion of 
GDP increased steadily from a real value of $118 billion U.S dollars making up 61.3% of GDP 
in 2009, to a real value of $165.4 billion U.S. dollars making up 69.5% of GDP in 2014 (Ibid.). 
Every year, the concentration of AFP investment in specific financial instruments varies 
depending on the amount of contributors choosing different fund types varying by riskiness. 
These financial instruments include government securities, financial institutions, enterprise 
investment and foreign investment (Ibid.). 
 In 2002, the pension system introduced 5 different kinds of funds; A-E, ranging from 
riskiest to most conservative. This would allow contributors to choose a fund based on the 
amount of risk they wanted to take on, based on their ages, wages and other factors. Fund A is 
allowed to invest in much riskier financial instruments like shares in publicly traded corporations 
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and publicly traded real-estate corporations, that the most conservative Fund E cannot invest in 
(Table 14).   
The global financial crisis of 2008 affected the returns of each type of fund uniquely. The 
real return rate of the riskiest fund A was -48.46% in November of 2008, -37.19% in Fund B, -
24.35% in Fund C, -13.08% in Fund D and -6.88% in Fund E (Table 13). This demonstrates the 
conservative characteristics in investment options taken by Fund E. Given that it targets workers 
nearing the age of retirement who cannot take on as much risk as younger people entering the 
workforce, the funds are invested in safer financial instruments than Fund A. 
 The transitional costs from the PAYG system are entirely state financed. In 1982, this 
cost was 6.4% of GDP. It decreased from this point through the early 2000s, where it was 6% of 
GDP in 2000 and 5.4% of GDP in 2004. By 2011, these transition costs only made up 3.5% of 
GDP and are continuously decreasing every year (Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, 2016) 
(Superintendencia de Pensiones, 2005) Mesa-Lago and Bertranou noted the following about 
financial sustainability: 
“The long-term financial sustainability of the re-reform is ensured by: a) a soli- 
darity PAYG pension fund with a reserve to finance new benefits; b) triennial actu- 
arial studies of the fund and solidarity systems that allocate fiscal funds according to 
the budget law, and elaborates annual reports on needed resources; c) quinquen- 
nial actuarial studies to assess the effects of demographic, financial and behavioural 
variables of affiliates upon RR and financial needs; d) an advisory board of experts 
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monitors the solidarity pension, its fiscal impact, sustainability and the need for 
possible adjustment; and e) the Commission of Users annually evaluates the finan- 
cial status (CCP, 2011, 2013; CUSP, 2011, 2012, 2014). The first actuarial study in 
2010 showed that the system will fulfil its obligations until 2030 (CCP, 2011). The 
second in 2013 confirmed the fund’s sustainability in all scenarios (even in one of 
extreme crisis), as contributions (on average) exceed pension costs.” (p. 41) 
 
(Table 13. Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones, 2015; Mesa-Lago et al., 2016) 
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 In Chile, the average income of people over the age of 60 is typically lower than the rest 
of the population, this is attributable to their gradual withdrawal from the labor market. If we 
look at 2013 data from CASEN, only considering personal income, people aged 65 and older 
make up 67% of the Chile’s entire population’s income. If we include subsidies in the form of 
monetary income, this rate increases to 70%. Additionally, 91% of the Chilean population 60 
years and older receive some kind of income either from their personal income or from subsidies. 
A predictor of higher income individuals and better quality of life is level of education. People 
60 years or older in 2013 received an average of 7.6 years of schooling, whereas the rest of the 
population received an average of 11 years of schooling (CASEN, 2013). The elderly population 
of Chile does not compose the majority of the impoverished population; in 2013, CASEN 
demonstrates that 3.9% of the impoverished population was elderly, while 10.3% of the entire 
population lives in poverty. If we measure poverty through dimensions of education, health, 
work, housing and social security, 8.5% of the elderly population lives in poverty while 15% of 
the total population lives in poverty (Ibid.). 
 Overall, the structural reform of 1981, and the re-reform of 2008, have had positive 
impacts on each individual guiding core principle of social security. Contributors as a percentage 
of the total labor force increased from 29% in 1982 to 64% in 2017. Affiliates of an AFP as a 
percentage of the labor force increased from 39% in 1982 to 115% in 2016. Contributions made 
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by women increased from 37% of all contributions in 2003, to 42% in 2016, getting closer to 
equal rates of contributions amongst male and female workers. Social solidarity was improved 
with the introduction of the Basic Solidarity Pension and the Basic Solidarity Complement. The 
number of women beneficiaries of the Basic Solidarity System was 244,815 in 2008 and 291,749 
by 2017. This program is especially beneficial for women, as the number of beneficiaries per 
year is consistently more than double for women than it is for men. In 2008, 113,630 men were 
receiving the Basic Solidarity Pension and by 2017, this number decreased to 107,568. 
In 2008, 3,251 women and 1,234 men were beneficiaries of the Basic Solidarity 
Complement, the figure for women rose drastically by 2017 to 436,895 and less drastically to 
317,865 for men. While both the BPS and APS increased their coverage by gender group since 
2008, women have continuously been the principal beneficiaries of both new programs, helping 
bridge the gap of gender inequality amongst pensioners.    
 The expansion of the poverty prevention tier in 2008, played a big role in alleviating 
income poverty. 60% of people who have access to a solidarity pension fall below the poverty 
line. Of this group 28% of beneficiaries belong to a family group receiving no income (CASEN, 
2011). It is estimated that without these programs, the poverty rate of people aged 65 years and 
older would have been 9.6% in 2011, instead of the actual rate of 7.5% (CASEN Survey, 2011). 
Additionally, these social assistance programs have helped alleviate extreme poverty in the 
population aged 65 and older, where it was estimated that without these programs, extreme 
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poverty would have reached 2.1% in 2011 instead of the actual rate of 1.6% (Comision 
Presidencial de Pensiones, 2013). 
 The total number of pensioners receiving standard retirement income increased from 
529,831 (164,287 women and 365,544 men) in 2004 to 1,509,512 (769,402 women and 740,110 
men) in 2017. While the number both men and women pensioners increased substantially 
between 2004 and 2017, the number of women pensioners increased much more drastically, 
eventually exceeding the amount of men pensioners by 2017. 
 While the average AFP administrative costs in 1981 and 2014 were 2.44% and 2.4% 
respectively, of a worker’s taxable income, the re-reform of 2008 mandated that employers pay 
workers’ disability and survivorship premiums, which reduces the net costs incurred by workers. 
 Financial sustainability has improved due to the varying levels of risk offered by five 
different types of funds. This has also stabilized the returns for older contributors who are moved 
to the most conservative fund in order to safeguard their retirement income. 
 Overall, the structural reform of 1981 and the re-reform of 2008 have positively 
influenced the Chilean pensions system based on the six core guiding principles of social 
security. While there are improvements that can still be made, like expanding social programs to 
a greater percentage of the population by increasing the minimum income for entry to the BPS, 
















































In 1997, Mexico’s pension system underwent a reform, replacing its previous public 
defined benefit pay-as-you-go pension system, implemented in 1944, with a fully funded 
privatized system of individual accounts. The old system was managed by two major 
Institutional groups; the Social Security Institution of Mexico (IMSS; Instituto Mexicano del 
Seguro Social) for employees working in the private sector, and the Social Security Institution’s 
Living Fund for Public Employees (ISSSTE; Fondo de la Vivienda del Instituto de Seguridad y 
Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores de Estado) for employees working in the public sector 
(IMSS). By 1992, the system of retirement savings, SAR (Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro), 
was added as a complement to the pay-as-you-go system. It functioned as a fully funded system 
created on the basis of individual retirement accounts for contributors to the IMSS or ISSSTE 
(OECD, 2016).  
 In a pay-as-you-go system, employees and employers make monthly contributions 
towards social security. The contributions made by current workers, are redistributed toward 
current retirees (past contributors), funding their retirement. Around the time of the 1997 reform, 
payroll taxes were very high (31.5%) (Ibid.). This tax was increased gradually over time to 
sustain the level of benefits distributed to the retired population in the form of old-age pensions. 
The system continuously ran deficits which resulted in an overall reduction of benefits for 
beneficiaries. 
 Similarly to Chile, prior to Mexico’s reform of 1997, there were different retirement 
programs for different occupational groups. While all programs for private-sector and 
independant employees contributing to social security were managed by the IMSS, there were 
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differences in received benefits across these groups. These inequalities created several problems. 
In some cases, a worker who changed jobs, even if his new job remained in the private-sector, 
faced the risk of losing all benefits accrued over the span of his previous years of contribution 
under his former employer (Ibid.). Old age benefits received upon the retirement of a contributor, 
depended on the worker’s average base salary during the last five years of work, divided by the 
minimum wage. Additionally, workers’ contributory history affected retirement income. 
However, overall benefits accumulated could not exceed the worker’s average earned income 
over his last five years of contribution (Grandolini and Cerda, 1998). 
 The IMSS system distributed several benefits including old age, disability, life insurance 
and severance at old age. Contributions to the IMSS were mandatory for employees who were 
current participants of the formal sector workforce. Additionally, contributions were voluntary 
for self-employed persons. Contributions were split up between the employee (25%), employer 
(70%) and the government (5%) (Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro). If a 
worker earned minimum wage, their total contribution was made on behalf of their employer. By 
1996, the average contribution rate for formal sector employees amounted to 8.5% of the 
worker’s contractual salary (Ibid.). While administrative costs represent roughly 0.6% of 
contributions, at the time of eligibility, the worker’s total contributions were redistributed as 3% 
on old age and severance at old age, 3% on disability and life, 1.5% on healthcare for retirees 
and 0.4% on social assistance (Villagómez y Hernández, 2009).  
 In order to qualify for an old age pension, the contributor had to have contributed for a 
minimum of 500 weeks (roughly 9.6 years, over the course of their working lives) with a 
minimum age of 65 or 60 for severance at old age (Ibid.). 
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 There was a government guarantee put in place in 1992 by the Sistema de Ahorro para el 
Retiro (SAR) that minimum pensions would not be less than the minimum wage at the 
beneficiary's time of retirement (CONSAR). The SAR system of 1992, was implemented as a 
mandatory complement to the public pay-as-you-go system. It is defined-contribution, fully 
funded and rooted in individual accounts wherein contributions by IMSS or ISSSTE affiliates are 
compulsory. The contributions made to SAR are separate and additional to the contributions 
made to the PAYG system. SAR incorporates two sub-accounts to workers’ individual accounts; 
one for housing and another for retirement. Contributions to SAR go into these sub-accounts and 
are made by employers at 5% of the worker’s base salary towards housing and 2% towards 
retirement (CONSAR).  
Problems with the PAYG System 
 While there were many factors contributing to the demise of the public pay-as-you-go 
system, some have been more significant than others. The decrease in fertility rates mixed with 
an increase in life expectancy had prominent effects on old-age pensions. While the life 
expectancy at birth in Mexico was 57.07 years old (59 for women and 55 for men) in 1961, it 
increased to 72.74 (75 for women and 69 for men) by 1995 (see Tables 15 and 16). Fertility rates 
have simultaneously decreased substantially from 6.77 in 1960 to 3.05 in 1995 (Table 17).  
These demographic trends contributed to the unsustainability of the pay-as-you-go 
system, attributable to the disproportionately small working population contributing towards the 
retirement of a rapidly growing retired population. In 1950, there were 67 workers per retiree, by 
1994 this number dropped to 8 workers per retiree (Rodríguez, 1999). 
The management of the social security trust fund was questionable before the reform. A 
big portion of the funds were spent on improvements in the national healthcare program, also 
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managed by the IMSS. While government projections expected the social security trust fund to 




(Table 15. Source: World Bank) 
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(Table 16. Source: World Bank) 
 





The Reform of 1997 
The reform of 1997 concentrated its efforts on the IMSS and the social services it 
provided. Under the new system, workers had to contribute 11.5% of their monthly salaries to 
their individual accounts (SSA). The government contributes 5% of the minimum wage salary to 
each worker’s individual account equal to an average monthly contribution of 13.5% of an 
average worker’s total payroll (Ibid.).  
Workers can open an additional voluntary savings sub-account for the purpose of retiring 
early or obtaining a larger pension by retirement, in which both employees and employers may 
contribute. These contributions, and the accumulated earnings within the accounts are tax 
deductible. The funds within these additional voluntary savings sub-accounts can be withdrawn 
before retirement with a cap on one withdrawal every six months (Villagómez y Hernández, 
2009).  
The individual accounts of private-sector workers are administered and managed by 
AFOREs, Administradoras de Fondos para el Retiro, private pension fund management 
companies. The contributions made towards an AFORE go into one of three sub-accounts under 
an individual account; Retirement, Severance in Old Age and Old Age, Housing and Voluntary 
Savings (Gobierno de México, Glossario). These private institutions administer accounts and 
manage the funds in them. While there is a requirement for these AFOREs to invest at least 65% 
of worker’s funds in government instruments, the range of possible investments exclude equity 
and foreign instruments (CONSAR).  
SIEFORES, Sociedades de Inversión Especializada en Fondos para el Retiro, are the 
mutual funds in which AFOREs invest individual account funds. There are different investment 
limits for each SIEFORES, ranging by the risk-level of each fund (Gobierno de México). 
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In order to reduce the possibility of rising administrative costs, workers are only allowed 
to switch AFOREs once a year. The only exception to this time restriction is if the AFORE 
chosen by a worker changes administrative costs or investment structure. In this case, the worker 
is allowed to switch out of that AFORE as soon as the changers are implemented (CONSAR).  
CONSAR, the National Commission of Savings for Retirement, is the regulating entity of 
AFOREs and SIEFORES. Additionally, CONSAR supervises them to make sure they are acting 
in accordance with proper financial, administrative and legal practices that are set forth by 
CONSAR. They also make sure that the AFOREs and SIEFORES enforce certain investment 
rules. While AFOREs administer and manage the pension funds for each individual worker, 
workers contributions are made to the IMSS where the funds are then allocated in the worker’s 
chosen AFORE.  
Once a worker reaches retirement at the age of 65, they are faced with two options; the 
first is to buy a lifetime annuity from a private insurance company, the second is to keep the 
funds in their individual accounts and make programmed withdrawals depending on their life 
expectancy. Since workers have property ownership over their individual accounts, in the case of 
a worker’s death, all remaining funds within their individual account are redistributed to the 
inheritors of the deceased’s estate (Rodríguez 1999).  
Since the reform, a worker is eligible for a government guaranteed minimum pension if 
they contributed to an AFORE for a minimum of 25 years. If a worker chooses to retire early, or 
before the age of 65, the funds accumulated in their retirement account must be able to purchase 
an annuity with a value of at least 30% higher than the legally mandated minimum pension 
(equal to the minimum wage at that particular point in time). Workers choosing early retirement 
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are not eligible for the government's minimum pension guarantee, even if they have met the 
contributory minimum of 25 years (Ibid.).  
Unlike post-pension-reform Chile, Mexican workers who were contributors under the pay-as-
you-go system, were not given the choice to stay in the public system past 2001 (Grandolini and 
Cerda, 1998). By 2001, if a worker had not chosen an AFORE for themselves, the government 
chose one for them. The Mexican government does not offer recognition bonds (government-
issued bonds allocated in a worker’s individual accounts, recognizing their contributions to the 
past pension system) to workers transitioning from the public to private system, they do 
however, offer a “life-switch” option. This option allows workers who were formerly part of the 
public system the choice to receive benefits calculated under the pre-reform system. Workers 
would be able to choose whichever option yielded a larger pension. This “life-switch” option 
will continue until every worker’s retirement, specifically those who had participated in the 














 As mentioned previously, coverage indicates what percentage of formal-sector workers 
are covered by the existent social security system. While this measure provides insight on the 
benefits a worker will receive upon retirement, whether they contribute as private-sector workers 
to the IMSS, or public-sector workers to the ISSSTE, it also allows us to see how many people 
will be eligible specifically for old-age pensions.  
 In this section, coverage will be measured by the percentage of workers contributing to 
IMSS and ISSSTE, as a percentage of the total labor force. In 2000, just three years after the 
reform, 41.99% of members within the labor force were contributing either to the IMSS or 
ISSSTE. This was a significant increase from the 1995 rate of 35% (Gobierno de México). The 
Chilean coverage rate was stagnant for a few years from 2000 to 2002, but picked up again. By 
2008, contributions made to the IMSS and ISSSTE as a percentage of the labor force grew to 
43.19% in 2006 and 46.56% by 2014 (Table 18). 
Another way of measuring coverage, focusing specifically on the elderly population, is 
seeing what percentage of the total elderly population (65 years and above) is already receiving a 
retirement pension (see Table 19 and 20). In 2000 only 39.17% of the elderly population was 
receiving a retirement pension. This percentage has increased gradually but consistently since 
then. By 2005, 40.32% of the elderly population was receiving a retirement pension. From 2010 
and 2015, the percentages of the elderly population receiving a retirement pension were 43.14% 
and 45.76% respectively. While a significant portion of the elderly population is still not covered 





(Table 18. Source: Gobierno de México) 
 




(Table 20. Source: Gobierno de México) 
Equal Treatment and Social Solidarity 
The reform of 1997 introduced a social quota; a government subsidy to individual 
worker’s retirement accounts. The monthly contributions by these government subsidies are 
determined by the worker’s salary. There are five income ranges with corresponding social 
quotas; i) A worker earning minimum wage receives a social quota equivalent to 7.11% of their 
salary, ii) A worker with a salary between 1.01 and 4 times the minimum wage receives a social 
quota equivalent to 1.70% of their salary, iii) A worker earning a salary between 4.01 and 7 
times the minimum wage, receives a social quota that equals 0.93% of their income, iv) A 
worker earning a salary between 7.01 and 10 times the minimum wage, receives a social quota of 
0.62% of their salary, v) A worker earning between 10.01 and 15 times the minimum wage, 
receives a social quota of 0.39% of their salary (OECD, 2016). Workers earning more than 15 
times the minimum salary do not receive a social quota, however, they do receive a monthly flat 
rate government contribution of 0.225% of their salaries (Ibid.). The social quota aspect of the 
new pension system was added in order to avoid workers falling below a minimum pension by 
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the time of retirement. This social quota complement demonstrated positive impacts on 
contributors’ pensions; by 2014 80% of IMSS pensioners had their retirement pensions topped-
off by the government to reach the legal minimum pension at the time of their retirement 
(Gobierno de Mexico). The social quota gives workers, especially low income-earners, incentive 
to contribute towards an individual account due to the government’s guarantee to grant workers 
(who have met all contributory and age requirements) a minimum pension, if their accumulated 
funds fall under the state-mandated minimum pension by retirement.   
 Workers in the public-sector contribute 6.125% of their base salaries to the ISSSTE, and 
are matched by a government subsidy of 5.175% of their basic salary which equates to a 11.3% 
average contribution rate (OECD, 2016). This is a greater contribution rate than private-sector 
employees whose monthly contribution rates (including employer, employee and government 
contributions) result in 6.5% of taxable income. While private-sector employees receive 
government subsidies that equal 0.225% of their taxable income, private-sector employees 
receive government subsidies of 5.175% of their basic salaries.  
By 2001, all private-sector employees were forced to switch from the previous PAYG 
system to the private system. Public-sector employees however, were allowed to continue in the 
PAYG system even after 2001. By 2007, new incentives were created for public-sector 
employees to switch to the new system. Public-sector workers choosing to start an individual 
account, would receive a recognition bond, recognizing their years of contributions to the public 
system. The recognition of past contributions, and the option to continue under the public system 
were two options that were not afforded to private-sector employees after 2001 (IOPS, 2017).  
 In 2001, the Mexican government introduced a non-contributory old-age pension 
program, Programa de Pensión para Adultos Mayores (PAM). In its introductory years, this 
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pension was provided to people that were 70 years or older, living in a town with 30,000 
inhabitants or fewer (CONEVAL) By 2013, the program expanded to the entire population of 
individuals 65 years and above, who were ineligible for retirement pensions due to a lack of 
contributions during a worker’s lifetime (typically attributable to informal labor participants). 
While this program had 1,863,945 beneficiaries in 2008, this number increased significantly to 
4,851,025 beneficiaries in 2013, one year after decreasing the age of eligibility by fives years to 
65 years and older (Ibid.). By 2014 there were 5,487,664 beneficiaries of the program (Table 21). 
Females are the principal beneficiaries of the non-contributory old-age pension; in 2012 and 
2013, 2,837, 574 and 3,221,475 beneficiaries were female while 2,013,445 and 2,225,157 were 
male respectively (Ibid.). In 2012, 27.8% of people 65 years and older were covered by pensions 
from the funds accumulated in their individual accounts, while 34.2% of the same age group’s 
population was covered by the PAM program (Ibid.). This program extends government support 
to people who would otherwise not be receiving old-age pensions due to lack of contributions 
throughout their lifetimes. 
 Social solidarity plays an important role in the prosperity of the Mexican old-age pension 
system. The social quota, adjusted for different income brackets, makes it easier for workers to 
be guaranteed a minimum pension by the time of retirement. If, by retirement, a worker’s 
pensions still falls below the government-mandated minimum pension, the government makes up 
this difference. The PAM program provides additional social assistance, extending coverage to 
the elderly population that would otherwise not been able to receive retirement income.  
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(Table 21. Source: CONEVAL) 
Gender Equity 
 Gender equity within the labor force is critical in achieving equal living standards during 
working years and equal benefits throughout retirement. Unequal labor force participation rates 
will translate into unequal rates of individual account holders in addition to inequality amongst 
post-retirement beneficiaries across genders.  
 In Mexico, a woman has a life expectancy that is, on average, 5 years older than a man. 
In 2016, at birth, a woman was expected to live 80 years and a man was expected to live for 74 
(World Bank) (Table 16). The difference in life expectancies between men and women, has been 
relatively constant since 1961. These demographic trends, in addition to sharp declines in 
Mexican fertility rates over the past 50 years, are transforming Mexico into a country with an 
aging, particularly female, population. In 1990, females made up 53% of the population aged 65 
years and older. This percentage has increased gradually to 55% in 2016 (Table 22). A growing 
ageing population of women in Mexico, makes the need for gender equality in the labor force 
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even more pressing. Women, living longer than men, will need greater retirement income to 
compensate for these additional years of life.  
In 1990, the participation rate of women in the labor force was 29.8% (Table 23). Due to 
the family culture in Mexico, many women are left home taking care of big families while men 
are the ones to enter the labor force. The participation rate of women in the labor force, did 
however, increase consistently between 1990 to 2016. By 1997, the year of the Mexican pension 
reform, the participation rate of women in the labor force grew to 33%. This rate grew slowly but 
continuously since then to a rate of 37.07% in 2016. While it is important to achieve higher 
levels of labor force participation by women in Mexico, it is also important to consider average 
wages by gender as these figures will ultimately determine the retirement income of contributors 
working in the formal sector. In 2005, the average hourly female wage was 94.7% of a male’s 
average hourly wage (Table 24). This rate increased from 2005 to 2013, reaching an all-time-
high in 2013, when a female’s average hourly wage was actually 102% of a male’s average 
hourly wage. By 2017, a woman’s average hourly wage was 98.6% of a man’s average hourly 
wage. It is important to understand the discrepancy between male and female average hourly 
wages as these wages will determine the contributions workers make throughout their working 
lives towards their individual retirement accounts. In 2002, the average monthly pension for a 
woman was $285 (adjusted to inflation in 2016) while for men it was $401 (OECD). In 2000, 
34% of IMSS contributors were women. By 2015, female contributors increased by 36.5% of 
total contributors to the IMSS (Table 25). 
Although the reform hasn’t caused a notable increase in the percentage of contributions 
by women to the IMSS, or in the participation rate of women in the labor force, there have been 
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new programs put in place since the reform of 1997 that have helped women receive retirement 
income.  
Firstly, the reform of 1997 expanded benefits to entire households. It is typical for a 
household receiving at least one pension to have that pension equal more than half of the 
household’s total income (Mesa-Lago et al., 2016). In this way, benefits for pensioners can be 
enjoyed by their dependents and spouses. Included in these benefits is health care, provided by 
the IMSS, it covers the spouse and parents of a pensioner. There is also a survivorship pension 
that is granted to the spouse of a deceased contributor. Since a contributor has property rights 
over the funds in their individual account, if the contributor is to pass away before depleting the 
funds within the account, the rest of the pension is given to the pensioners dependents and/or 
spouse (Ibid.). In 2000, there were 459,747 pensions granted to widows. By 2015, this number 
increased to 724,473 (Table 26). The pension granted to widows provides financial security to 
women who might have depended on their spouse's’ income throughout their lives.  
Lastly, the introduction of the non-contributory pension for older adults (PAM) in 2001 
has shown to have a greater beneficial impact on elderly women than men. In 2012, 34.2% of the 
elderly population of Mexico was covered by this non-contributory pension. In 2013, 58% of the 
beneficiaries of this program were women and by 2014, 60% of the beneficiaries of this program 
were women (CONEVAL).  
 Since the pension reform of 1997, there have been negligible increases in the rate of 
female contributions to the IMSS. However, there have been increases in female average hourly 
salaries (as percentages of male’s), in survivorship pensions granted out to widows and in female 
beneficiaries of the PAM program. The expanded coverage of one pensioner’s benefits to other 
members of that household are helping provide income for women who are not working, but 
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there still needs to be greater incentive for women to join the formal labor sector and save for 
their own retirement.  
 
(Table 22. Source: INEGI) 
 
 





(Table 24. Source: Gobierno de México) 
 
 




(Table 26. Source: INEGI) 
Adequacy of Benefits 
 Once a worker reaches the age of retirement, they are faced with the choice of purchasing 
an annuity from a private insurance company or making programmed withdrawals. It is 
mandatory for a pensioner with a spouse to purchase a joint annuity so that in the case of the 
pensioner’s death, the remaining funds may be paid out to the surviving spouse on a monthly 
basis (Rodríguez, 1999). The old-age benefits received upon retirement in the form of pension 
income depend on the amount of time a worker has contributed towards their individual 
retirement account and their salary. The government-subsidized social quota is intended to 
decrease the likelihood of pensions falling under the legal minimum wage (which is equal to the 
legal minimum pension) at the time of retirement. If, however, the pension is less than the legally 
mandated minimum wage at a pensioner’s time of retirement, the government makes up the 
difference. Therefore, a worker who has met all contributive and age requirements, will not 
receive a pension under the legally mandated minimum wage at the time of their retirement due 
to the two government assistance programs stated above.   
 The pension program for older adults (PAM) is offered to elderly people (65 years and 
above) who have not participated in the formal labor sector throughout their lives or who have 
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not contributed towards individual accounts for long enough. At the time of its inception in 2001, 
the program had strict geographical limitations with an age of retirement of 70 years old (5 years 
older than the normal retirement age). By 2007, the program dropped the geographical restriction 
and expanded its coverage to all Mexicans 70 and older, who did not have retirement income and 
who passed a means-test. By 2013, the program decreased the age of eligibility to 65. This non-
contributory program is a government funded way of providing retirement income (adjusted to 
inflation) to the elderly population that would not have received any retirement income 
otherwise. In 2012, the program granted its beneficiaries monthly incomes of 500 pesos 
(adjusted to inflation in 2015) (approximately $26.43). By 2013, this income increased to 525 
pesos a month (adjusted to inflation in 2015) (approximately $27.75). From 2014 to present, the 
monthly income has remained constant at 580 pesos (adjusted to inflation 2017) (approximately 
$30.66) (CONEVAL).  
Administrative Costs 
 In 1997, when AFORES became the private institutions to manage pension funds in 
Mexico, the administrative costs were set at 1.9% of the worker’s monthly earnings. This 
administrative cost remained constant until 2001. It decreased to 1.4% in 2005 and increased 
slightly to 1.5% in 2006. In 2008, AFORES got rid of their administrative costs and replaced 
them with commissions from returns. This lowered competition between AFORES in a sense, 
because people were not faced with the immediacy of a salary reduction impacted by 
administrative costs. Instead, the new commission that the AFORES would collect would be 
taken from the funds already in the individual account which would affect future benefits rather 
than immediate income (Gobierno de México). In 2009, the average administrative fees of the 
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AFORES was 1.87% of accumulated earnings on investments. This fee has gone down since 
then to a 1.03% average fee in 2017 (Table 27).  
 The government has created competitive incentives amongst AFORES by choosing two 
AFORES per year, with the lowest commission fees. Every year, the new participants of the 
labor force would be placed into either one of these two AFOREs if they did not choose an 
AFORE for themselves. 
 
(Table 27. Source: AIOS, 2005; OECD, 2016; James et al., 2000 and 2001) 
Financial Sustainability 
 The new structure of the Mexican pension system after 1997 shifted the financial burden 
of retirement from the collective population, to the individual worker. The glossary of the 
Gobierno de México (The Government of Mexico) defines SIEFORES (Sociedades de Inversión 
Especializada en Fondos para el Retiro) as “the mutual funds where the AFORES invest the 
worker’s resources in order to generate yields. There exist 4 different SIEFORES according to 
the age of each worker, namely: SB1 for 60 and older workers, SB2 for workers from 46 to 59 
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years old, SB3 for workers from 37 to 45 years old and SB4 for workers 36 years old and 
younger.”  
 Since the inception of the new system until present, there have been many changes in the 
investment structure of SIEFORES. In 1997, SIEFORES were only allowed to invest in debt and 
currencies (Table 27). The differences between the four SIEFORES are based on the limits 
placed on individual investment instruments. By 2007, in addition to debt and currencies, 
SIEFORES were allowed to invest in equity, Mexican private equity funds and real estate trusts 
and structured assets. By 2017, commodities, swaptions and REITs were added to the list of 
investment possibilities for SIEFORES (CONSAR).   
Each SIEFORE faces a different level of risk in terms of its investment structure. The 
riskiest SIEFORE SB4, is offered to the youngest age group of workers, as they can afford to 
take on more risk than older workers. In 2017, the limit on investment in equity was 40% for the 
riskiest fund SB4 and 5% for the safest fund SB1. The medium-risk fund SB2 and riskier 
medium-risk fund SB3 had limits of 25% and 30% respectively. Similarly, the limit on 
investment in commodities is 10% for SB4 and 0% for SB1 (Table 29). These numbers show the 
limit on risky investments in the safest fund SB1. The reason for sticking with safer investment 
strategies for workers that are aged 60 years and older, is because workers in this age group do 
not have many working years left in them before retirement. If these accounts were to face 
negative returns, they would not have as much time as a worker within the SB2 age group to 
compensate for the bad investment. Instead of trying to maximize returns under SB1, the 
investments are structured in such a way to maximize account stability instead.  
Average annual nominal return rates for each SIEFORE are consistently at different 
levels but the trends among all four types of SIEFORES, from 2009 to 2017, seem to vary 
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simultaneously showing that despite investment caps on certain risky investments, all four 
SIEFORES are similarly affected by market conditions. In March of 2009, SB1 was the only 
SIEFORE to have a positive average nominal annual return of 5.07% (Table 30). SB2, SB3 and 
SB4 all experienced negative returns of -0.18%, -1.89% and -3.90% respectively. The order of 
the returns for that year were ordered lowest (SB4) to highest (SB1), demonstrating the success 
of the safer fund SB1’s intentions to keep the accounts of older workers safe.  
In February 2010, all funds experienced high rates of return (SB3; 21.27%, SB2; 18.06%, 
SB1; 12.95%) but SB4 experienced its highest return rate to date of 24.63%. SB3 and SB2 
experienced their highest return rates in November 2009 of 21.27% and 18.49% respectively. In 
April of 2013, SB1 experienced its highest return rate of 15.54%.  
The financial sustainability aspect of these funds seems to have been positive so far. 
There have been short periods of negative returns (March 2009, April 2014 and January 2016) 
that have recovered quickly keeping the system afloat. For the most part these funds have 
experienced positive nominal rates of return.   
 
(Table 28. Source: CONSAR) 
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(Table 29. Source: CONSAR 2017) 
 
 




 The Mexican pension reform of 1997 has demonstrated positive impacts on most aspects 
of the social security core guiding principles. Coverage is not the only thing to have improved 
since the inception of the new system. With the introduction of a minimum pension guarantee 
and a government-subsidized social quota, retired workers are not living off less than the legally 
mandated minimum pension at the time of their retirement. This translates into better financial 
conditions for the retired population that would not have accrued enough funds in their accounts 
to equal a minimum pension under the old system. The creation of the PAM program has also 
extended coverage to the elderly population that would not have received any retirement income 
by the age of retirement under the old system. Administrative costs were low until 2008 when 
the pension fund managers decided to change this fee to a commission they collected based on 
the net annual returns on individual worker’s accounts. This switch in fee structure makes it so 
that low-wage earners do not have to face immediate decreases in their wages in the form of 
payments to pension fund managers. The financial sustainability of the program is positive, 
based on each fund’s trends from March 2009 to September 2017. The most pressing issue seems 
to be the lack of incentive for women to enter the workforce. If more women enter the workforce 
then more women will be covered by their own pensions by the time they reach the age of 
retirement. Although the benefits offered by the social security system and the pension system 
can cover a pensioner’s entire family, it is important to strive for universal coverage which can 




















































In Uruguay, the first law to provide social security to all private-sector employees was 
passed in 1919. A welfare system developed in conjunction throughout the 20th century. Until 
1967, the extended welfare system was managed by independent funds. The Bank of Social 
Protection (BPS) was the main administrator of pensions and other benefit plans including health 
care, unemployment and family allowances (World Bank, 2012). In 1979, the military 
government implemented some changes to the administrative body of social security and the 
benefits offered by the system. The BPS was replaced by the General Directorate of Social 
Security under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The General Directorate of Social 
Security was in charge of the retirement funds of public workers, professionals (people with a 
university degree), and workers in manufacturing and trade industries (Ibid.). It was also in 
charge of other programs such as for family allowances, healthcare and the distribution of 
unemployment and maternity benefits. Before the changes of 1979, the retirement age had been 
50 years old for men and 45 years old for women. After 1979, there was a ten-year increase to 60 
years old for men and 55 years old for women. The military government also increased the 
minimum years of contribution to 30 years (Papadópulos, 1992).  
 The democratic political system in Uruguay was re-established in 1984. The National 
Conciliatory Program, in charge of transitioning the country from the autocratic regime, took 
measures in changing the structure of social security put in place by the military government in 
1979. The measures taken by the National Conciliatory Program involved re-establishing the 
Bank of Social Protection, adjusting pensions to inflation (previously adjusted to the Average 
Salary Index), and to increase pensions that were below the minimum wage to the level of 
minimum wage (Mosconi, 1997). While BPS was the main provider of social security benefits 
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across Uruguay, there were five additional groups that provided special benefits to the following 
five occupational groups; police, professionals (people who graduated from universities), public 
notaries, military and bank employees. (World Bank, 2007) By 1996, if a formal-sector worker 
was not contributing to a fund, they would be placed under the BPS. The benefits received by 
old-age retirees in the pre-reform system were calculated as a percentage of the “basic retirement 
wage”; the pensioner’s averaged salary over the last three years of work (adjusted to inflation) 
(Ibid.).  
Problems with the PAYG System 
 The PAYG system faced challenges as demographic trends in Uruguay changed over 
time. In 1960, the average life expectancy at birth was 68 years old. By 1994, two years before 
the reform, it had increased to 73 years (Table 31). This positive trend, combined with a 
gradually decreasing fertility rate (Table 32) made Uruguay a country with an ageing population. 
This became difficult in terms of the PAYG system because a smaller working population had to 
support the retirement benefits of a growing elderly population; in 1980, there were 1.4 
contributors for every pensioner and in 1995 there were 1.1 contributors for every pensioner 
(Papadópulos, 1992). In 1963, the elderly population (65 years and older) equaled 19.3% of the 
working population and has increased substantially year to year. By 1994 the elderly population 
was as big as 29% of the working population, and has stayed stable ever since (28.30% in 2016) 
(Ibid.).  
The consequences of an ageing population manifested themselves as increased 
government expenditures on retirement benefits with simultaneous declines in the real values of 
pensions over the thirty-year time-frame spanning from 1962 to 1991 (World Bank, 2007). The 
real value of pensions declined by 30% by 1991 (Ibid.).   
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 In addition to these problems, the public system did not have a good way of certifying the 
number of years a worker had contributed because registered workers were measured vaguely 
and inconsistently. Some workers were able to benefit from this aspect of mismanagement, in 
1999, 23% of BPS expenditures were made out to individuals who had no contributory history at 
all (Bérgolo, 2013) 
The Reform of 1995 
 The reform of 1995 involved the addition of a new pillar of social security, transforming 
the social security system into a multi-pillar scheme. The first pillar of this new system was 
carried over from the pre-reform; a defined-benefit PAYG system administered by the Bank of 
Social Protection. The second pillar of the new scheme was a system of individual accounts, 
administered and managed by private fund managers. These private institutions are called 
Administradoras de Fondos de Ahorro Previsional (AFAPs). The third pillar is a voluntary 
savings pillar for workers earning above $15,000 pesos (Uruguayan pesos adjusted to inflation in 
2000) (SSA 2011). 
First pillar contributions are made by employers and employees earning a maximum 
monthly salary of $5,000 pesos (Uruguayan pesos adjusted to inflation in 2000) (Ibid.). This 
pillar receives specific taxes, granting first-pillar contributors financial assistance when 
necessary. Contributions to the second pillar of the multi-pillar system are mandatory for 
workers earning between $5,000 and $15,000 pesos (Uruguayan pesos adjusted to inflation in 
2000). These workers are only required to contribute an amount that exceeds the minimum 
$5,000 pesos. Additionally, it requires participation from all active members of the labor force 
who are under 40 years old starting in 1996. Workers who are under 40 years old and do not earn 
salaries greater than $5,000 pesos are not required to contribute to the second pillar (Ibid.). 
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However, in this situation, a worker contributing half of his contribution to the second-pillar 
would be granted a bonus that equaled 50% of the base salary calculated under the first pillar. 
This option would create incentive to participate in the private scheme. The third pillar of the 
new system was offered to workers earning monthly salaries greater than $15,000 pesos. These 
workers have the option of making additional contributions to their individual accounts.  
Upon retirement, the funds within workers’ individual accounts are moved from the 
AFAP to an insurance company that the worker chooses, at which time annuities from both the 
first, second and third pillar are granted to workers. Age and gender are the determinant factors 
of the minimum annuity paid out to workers. The Superintendency of Insurance functions as the 
administrative and regulative body of first pillar. The Central Bank of Uruguay is in charge of 
regulating and supervising insurance companies and the private companies that manage workers’ 
individual accounts (Forteza, 2005).    
 























Until 1996, contribution rates were 13% of a worker’s gross salary, and private-sector 
employer contributions were 24.5%. Public-sector employer contributions fell between the range 
of 19.5% and 24.5% (Bertranou, 2004). The maximum benefit equaled a salary of roughly $800 
a month (adjusted to inflation in 2002). Additionally, another ceiling was implemented for 
beneficiaries receiving benefits from more than one fund at 15 times the minimum salary (this 
was enforced regardless of the number of jobs a worker had). The system’s replacement rate up 
until 1996, was set at 70% of the worker’s average salary during their final three years of 
working (Ibid.).  
After the reform, these numbers changed. Worker contribution rates increased to 15% of 
their total monthly salaries up to $24,709 pesos (Uruguayan pesos adjusted to inflation in 2011) 
and 7.5% of covered payroll by the employer (World Bank). A worker contributing to both the 
first and second pillar contributed 15% of their first $24,709 pesos earned (Uruguayan pesos 
adjusted to inflation in 2011) to the first pillar and 15% of the amount exceeding $24,709 pesos 
toward the second pillar. No contributions are made from the part of the employer under the 
second pillar. If the worker is enrolled in the second pillar voluntarily, then they contribute 7.5% 
of their total monthly salary (SSA, 2011). 
By 1993, 65% of the labor force was contributing to the BPS under the PAYG system. 
This rate remained relatively consistent until 1999, when there were decreases in contributors, 
with the lowest rate of the period being 53% in 2002 (Table 33). By 2003, the percentage of the 
labor force contributing to the first pillar of the new system was 58%. By 2005, it had increased 
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substantially to 69%. Ever since the decreases in contributions from 1999 to 2002, there has been 
a steady increase in coverage of the labor force. In 2016, 83% of labor force participants were 
contributing toward the first-pillar of the new system.  
In 1996, 37% of contributors contributing to the BPS were also contributing to an 
individual account (Table 34). In just one year, contributors to the second-pillar of the system 
increased to 47% of total contributors. This number has increased steadily with a minor decrease 
between 2003 and 2005 where second-pillar contributors made up 68% and 62% of total 
contributors respectively. From 2005 onward, the amount of second-pillar contributors has 
continuously risen with drastic increases between 2009 and 2016. In 2009, 69% of total 
contributors had an individual account. By 2013, this rose to 81% and in 2016 it reached its 
highest rate to date of 92% of total contributions.  
The elderly population receiving some sort of pension has increased from 75% in 1994, 
to 88% in 2016 demonstrating a positive trend in elderly coverage since the reform of 1995.   
 
(Table 33. Source: AIOS, 2017; BPS Boletín, 2003 and 2017) 
 73 
 
(Table 34. Source: AIOS, 2017; BPS Boletín, 2003 and 2017) 
Equal Treatment and Social Solidarity 
 In the post-reform pension system, inequality persists. Altogether, pensions to civil 
servants, professionals, military workers, police, and trade and manufacturing workers, make up 
approximately 22.8% of total pensions (BPS Boletín 2017). This number however, has decreased 
since 1996, when the total amount of “special pensions” was 26% of total pensions. In 1996, a 
civil servants average monthly pension was worth 1.3 times a regular worker’s average monthly 
pension, a professional’s average monthly pension during this time was worth 2.2 times an 
average worker’s pension (Table 35). By 2006, a civil servants average monthly pension 
increased slightly to 1.4 times a regular worker’s average monthly pension. A professional’s 
average pension remained constant at 2.2 times a regular average pensioner. Since then, civil 
servant’s average pensions have remained constant, still consisting of 1.4 times a regular average 
pension. Professionals’ average pensions have decreased to 2 times an average regular pension 
by 2016.  
 There continues to be inequality in the administration of benefits toward pensioners under 
the reformed Uruguayan pension system. These inequalities exist due to the superior benefits 
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given to the five special occupational groups (civil servants, professionals, military, police and 
workers in manufacturing and trade) that also received special benefits before the reform. In 
brief, the reform of 1995 did not help bridge inequality across average pensioners and members 
of the five special groups.   
 Before the pension reform, there existed a social assistance program that targeted low-
income elderly people. A retiree's eligibility was assessed by a means-test. If the person fell 
below a certain income, they would receive monthly retirement income financed by the state. 
The reform of 1995 continued to offer this non-contributory social assistance program provided 
by the BPS, however, the eligibility age increased by five years to 70 years of age for both men 
and women. In 1994, the average pension income for a beneficiary of the non-contributory old-
age pension was $688.94 current Uruguayan pesos (approximately $23.27 USD) (Table 36). By 
1996, the value of an average non-contributory pension almost doubled to $1237.56 current 
Uruguayan pesos per month (approximately $43 USD). It has consistently increased, reaching 
$2567 current Uruguayan pesos in 2006 (approximately $88.56 USD) and $8252.2 current 
Uruguayan pesos in 2016 (approximately $284.62 USD). The transition to the multi-pillar 
program has proven to have positive effects on the real value of non-contributory old-age 
pensions.  
 The Uruguayan social assistance pension program has helped expand coverage of the 
elderly population (70 years and above) in Uruguay. In 1993, 14.5% of the elderly population 
was being covered by the non-contributory pension program (Table 37). By 2006, the program 
saw a slight increase in beneficiaries to 15.3%. As of 2006, the percentage of the elderly 
population benefiting from this program has stayed within this range with very little fluctuation 
between years. By 2009, this rate increases to 16.8%, and reached its highest point of 18.03% in 
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2016. Although there have been very subtle and gradual increases in coverage of the elderly 
population by the non-contributory pension program over the past two decades, it has shown to 
be moving in a positive direction since the reform.  
We can also examine the coverage of the social assistance program by seeing what 
percentage of total pensioners are beneficiaries of the non-contributory pension program (Table 
38). In 1993, 22% of total pensioners were beneficiaries of a non-contributory pension. This rate 
remained constant throughout the year of the reform. After the reform in 1995, the percentage of 
total pensioners receiving a non-contributory pension remained relatively consistent at a rate of 
23% until 2005 at which point if reached 24%. Since then, this rate has increased more 
drastically. By 2010, this rate increased to 30% and in 2015, the social assistance program 
reached its peak coverage of total pensioners at 34%. This rate has since decreased mildly to 
33.9% in 2016.  
The social assistance non-contributory pension program offered by the BPS has expanded 
coverage since the reform of 1995. The real values of these pensions have continuously grown 
since the pre-reform era, leaving the low-income elderly population in a better post-retirement 
financial position than before the reform.   
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(Table 35. Source: BPS Boletín, 2003 and 2017) 
 
 




(Table 37. Source: BPS Boletín, 2003 and 2017) 
 
 
(Table 38. Source: BPS Boletín, 2003 and 2017) 
Gender Equity 
 Gender equity within a pension system is critical in order to achieve equal levels of 
benefits and quality of life across genders in the retired population. In 2016, the life expectancy 
at birth for a woman was 80.5 years old and 74.1 for men (FRED 2016). In Uruguay, since 
women have a greater life expectancy than men, retirement income is especially important for 
them.  
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 In order for women to receive pension benefits under the multi-pillar pension system, 
they must participate in the labor force. In 1993, the female composition of the total labor force 
was 40.3% (Table 39). This rate reached 41% during the year of the reform. While this rate has 
increased slowly, by 2016, the female composition of the total labor force was 44.5%. Compared 
to Chile and Mexico, Uruguay has the highest female participation rate in the labor force. In 
terms of the elderly population of Uruguay, females have consistently outnumbered men. In 
1960, 55% of the population aged 65 and older was female (Table 40). This rate has only 
increased since then; by 1990 the female elderly population was 58% of the total elderly 
population and by 1995 it was 59%. This rate reached its highest point in 2010, when it was 
61.3% and has remained relatively stable since then decreasing slightly to 61.15% in 2016.  
While females are not the predominant participants of the Uruguayan labor force, they 
are the principal beneficiaries of old-age pensions in the country. In 1993, 55% of total 
pensioners were female and little has changed since then (Table 41). During the time period 
spanning from 1993 to 2016, the lowest and highest rates of female pensioners to total 
pensioners were in 2008 and 2015 when they were 54.20% and 55.20% respectively. This rate 
was 55.18% in 2016. The number of total pensioners includes pensioners of the non-contributory 
old-age pension, explaining why females are the primary beneficiaries even though they do not 
compose the greater portion of the labor force.  
In 1993, 57.75% of beneficiaries of the non-contributory old-age pension were female, 
this was the highest rate between 1993 and 2016 (Table 42). This number has since decreased, 
nearing a level of equality amongst male and female beneficiaries of the social assistance 
program. By 1996, this rate was 56%, reaching its lowest rate in 2015 of 53.21%. By 2016, 
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female beneficiaries of the non-contributory pension made up 53.28% of total beneficiaries of 
the program.      
Female affiliation to the second-pillar of the multi-pillar pension system has 
demonstrated a positive trend since 2003 when 41.8% of total AFAP affiliates were female 
(Table 43). In 2009 and 2010 this rate increased to 42.3% and 43.2% respectively. Throughout 
this period, the only declines in female affiliation to AFAPs were in 2006 and 2007 where the 
rates fell from 41.7% in 2005 to 41.5% for the two following years respectively. By 2016, this 
rate had reached its highest point of 44.6%.  
The new multi-pillar pension system in Uruguay has not had a substantial effect on 
gender equity in the pension system. The rate of female pensioners as a percentage of total 
pensioners has remained practically unchanged since 1993. Facing few and minor fluctuations 
between 2001 to 2010. The non-contributory old-age pension program has faced the greatest 
change in gender composition from 1993 to 2016, going from a female composition of 57.75% 
to 53.2% respectively. The decrease in female beneficiaries to the non-contributory program is 
approaching an equal rate of pensioners across genders. Female affiliation to AFAPs has evolved 
slightly but positively since 2003, where it went from 41.8% to 44.6% in 2016. This steadily 
increasing participation rate of females in the individual account pillar of the system is nearing 
an equal rate of affiliates across genders.  
Inequality within the pre-reform Uruguayan pension system was not as severe as in Chile 
or Mexico’s pre-reform systems. Even though female participation in the labor force is not 
perfectly equal, women have been the principal beneficiaries of old-age pensions, which was not 
the case in pre- or post-reform Chile and Mexico. Going forward, Uruguay should aim to attain 
higher gender equality within the labor force in order for both men and women to obtain equal 
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benefits during their working lives, in addition to their post-retirement lives. The non-
contributory program that has favored women since 1993 should continue to increase its 
coverage of low-income elderly males in order to reduce poverty rates across this demographic. 
Overall, among Mexico and Chile, Uruguay is the country that has demonstrated trends moving 
towards near-perfect levels of gender equity after its reform.   
 
(Table 39. Source: FRED, 2016) 
 
 




(Table 41. Source: BPS, 2017) 
 




(Table 43. Source: FIAP, 2017) 
Adequacy of Benefits 
 Before 1979, the age of retirement was 55 for women and 60 for men. The military 
government increased these ages to 65 for women and 70 for men. Additionally, under the 
autocratic regime, both the layoff and maternity benefits were eliminated. Once democracy was 
re-established in 1984, benefits were inconsistent. There were five different groups, in addition 
to the BPS, that distributed benefits to workers of different occupations. At this time, the age of 
eligibility for old-age benefits was 70 years old, although it would soon drop again to 65 (SSA, 
2011). The BPS provided maternity allowances, old-age pensions, health and unemployment 
benefits. Old-age retirement benefits were calculated based on a percentage of the average salary 
(adjusted to inflation) of the worker’s last three years of work (World Bank, 2007). 
After the reform of 1995, the benefits of the system and the eligibility age for old-age 
pensions changed. The age of eligibility for an old-age pension under the first pillar fell to 60 
years with a minimum of 30 years of contributions. Under the second pillar of individual 
accounts, the age also declined to 60 years old with a minimum of 30 years of contributions. 
Women are granted one year of contribution for each child they have with a maximum of five 
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credited years (Ibid.). Workers in dangerous occupations are afforded similar assistance in that 
they can be credited for contributory years depending on the level of hazard they face in their 
jobs (SSA, 2011). 
Benefits under the first pillar are calculated as 45% of the beneficiary’s average monthly 
salary over the last 10 years of work or 45% of 105% of the beneficiary’s average monthly salary 
in 20 of their highest-earning years. The pensioners retirement income is decided based on 
whichever calculation is lowest. For every additional year worked over the mandatory 30 years, 
there is a 1% increase in real pension value, up to a total of 35 years. Afterward, there is a 0.5% 
annual increase in real pension value for every additional year worked over 35 years until this 
percentage reaches 2.5%. Workers who have not met the contribution minimum of 30 years 
under the first pillar are granted a 2% annual increase in pension for every year worked after the 
age of 60. This assistance is granted until the beneficiary completes the requirement of 30 years 
of contribution, or until the beneficiary reaches the age of 70 (BPS Boletín, 2017). Under the 
second pillar, the accumulated funds within a worker’s individual account is used to purchase an 
annuity from an insurance company of their choice. In 2011, the minimum pension, paid out on a 
monthly basis was $3,339 pesos (Uruguayan pesos adjusted to inflation in 2011) and the 
maximum pension paid out to members contributing to the first and second pillar was $30,145 
pesos (Uruguayan pesos adjusted to inflation in 2011).  
The real values of average old-age pensions have improved since 1995. In 1994, the 
value of an average old-age pension was $539 Uruguayan pesos (adjusted to inflation in 2016, 
approximately $18 US dollars) (Table 44). By 1996, just one year after the reform, the value of 
the average old-age pension increased to $1,029.68 Uruguayan pesos (adjusted to inflation in 
2016, approximately $32.50 US dollars). Since the creation of the new multi-pillar pension 
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system, the real value of the average old-age pension increased constantly, reaching its highest 
value of $9,466.90 Uruguayan pesos (adjusted to inflation in 2016, approximately $326.61 US 
dollars) in 2016. The reform of 1995 has positively affected the real value of average Uruguayan 
pensions, consequently increasing the monthly retirement income and overall financial standing 
of elderly people receiving old-age pensions in Uruguay. 
 
(Table 44. Source: BPS Boletín, 2003 and 2017) 
Administrative Costs 
 When the multi-pillar structure of the pension system was implemented in 1995, the pillar 
of individual accounts introduced an administrative cost that would be paid by the worker. 
Administrative costs are the fees charged by private fund managers for their services. In 1997, 
the average fee charged by the four AFAPs was 2.05% of a worker’s monthly salary (Table 45) 
since then, this cost has decreased. By 2002, the administrative cost of AFAPs was 1.73%. In 
2003, the cost increased slightly to 1.94% where it remained constant until 2005 when it went 
back down to 1.8%. The administrative cost of AFAPs has decreased consistently reaching its 
lowest cost in 2016 of 1.4% of a worker’s salary.  
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In 2002, AFAPs introduced an additional cost to be paid by the worker; a commission 
based on the annual real returns within worker’s individual accounts. While this commission was 
very low from its inception, the idea is that the profits made from these commissions accumulate 
and increase as the funds in worker’s individual accounts increase. In 2002, the average 
commission charged was 0.0025% of worker’s individual account’s annual real returns (Table 
45). By 2007, this commission fell to 0.0017%. However, it increased in 2008 to 0.0027%. Since 
then, AFAP average commissions have fallen consistently, reaching their lowest commission fee 
in 2015 of 0.0014%.         
 
(Table 45. Source: FIAP) 
Financial Sustainability 
 Under the new Uruguayan pension system, workers’ individual account funds are 
managed by private management companies called Administradora de Fondos de Ahorro 
Previsional (Administrators of Provisional Saving Funds), AFAPs. AFAP responsibilities 
include investing workers’ funds in safe but profitable instruments to yield positive annual 
returns for workers. While limits on investment instruments are put in place by the regulatory 
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body, The Central Bank of Uruguay, of the system, to ensure stability of accumulated funds, an 
AFAP is financially sustainable if it is at least maintaining the level of funds contributed by the 
worker so that by retirement a worker is receiving at least as much as he contributed. 
 Since the inception of the system’s second pillar, there have been four AFAPs in charge 
of managing funds contributed to the private pension system. The accumulated net assets under 
management of these four AFAPs have increased substantially since the creation of the multi-
pillar system. In 1996, there were $51 million US dollars (adjusted to inflation in 2017) worth of 
net assets under AFAP management (Table 46). This number nearly quadrupled by 1997, 
reaching $191 million US dollars. The AFAPs only showed negative changes in net assets from 
one period to another in 2002, 2008 and 2015. In 2001, there were $1.45 billion assets under 
management, this figure declined to $839 million US dollars by 2002. After this period, net 
assets under management increased until 2008, when they declined again from $3.4 billion US 
dollars in 2007 to $2.9 billion US dollars. The latest decline in net assets under management 
occurred in 2015, when the assets declined from the 2014 figure of $11 billion US dollars to 
$10.61 billion real US dollars. Since 2015, the net assets managed by AFAPs have increased to 
$15.2 billion US dollars in the third quarter of 2017.  
The investment portfolios of these four AFAPs have evolved and diversified over time. In 
2001, AFAPs were predominantly making fixed-income investments. These kinds of investments 
earn returns on a fixed schedule while the rate of return can vary from one payment period to 
another (Fidelity). The fixed-income investments made by the AFAPs in 2001 were in 
government bonds (state fixed-income), corporate bonds (corporate fixed-income), financial 
fixed-income and liquid assets. The average of all four AFAPs investment in these instruments 
was 61.23% in government bonds, 6.01% in corporate bonds, 21.69% in financial fixed-income 
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instruments and 11.07% in liquid assets (Table 47). In 2005, the investment portfolio of these 
AFAPs included other assets instead of liquid assets. During this year, investment in government 
bonds increased to 83.37%, financial fixed-income investment decreased to 8.82%, corporate 
fixed-income investment decreased slightly to 4.29% and investment in other assets was at 
2.53%. By 2010, the AFAP investment portfolio expanded its diversification to include corporate 
equity, foreign fixed-income and liquid asset investments. State fixed-income investments 
continued to be the principal investment instrument of AFAP funds, comprising 83.85% of total 
investments, while corporate fixed-income was 7.94% of total investments, corporate equity was 
0.10%, financial fixed-income was 1.12%, foreign fixed-income was 6.14% and liquid assets 
were 0.86%. In 2015, the average investment portfolio of the four AFAPs were as follows: 
61.85% in state fixed-income, 9.01% in corporate fixed-income, 4.37% in corporate equities, 
6.44% in financial fixed-income, 10% in foreign fixed-income and 8.34% in liquid assets. Table 
47 provides snapshots of the evolving diversification of AFAP investment portfolios over 15 
years. While state fixed-income, corporate fixed-income and financial fixed-income investments 
are consistent throughout AFAP investment portfolios throughout this period, other investments 
such as corporate equity, foreign fixed-income and liquid assets are not consistent investment 
instruments chosen by AFAPs.  
Although the AFAPs yielded positive real net returns in 2001, 2005, 2010 and 2016 of 
20.27%, 4.77%, 17% and 0.2% respectively, the private management companies have seen years 
of negative real net return rates (Table 47 and Table 49). In 2008, AFAPs saw their first, and 
greatest, negative net real return rate of -20.81%. The investment portfolio of this year included 
state fixed-income (81.80%), corporate fixed-income (6.89%), corporate equities (0.16%), 
financial fixed-income (3.55%), foreign fixed-income (4.17%) and liquid assets (3.43%) (Table 
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48). In 2011 and 2013, AFAPs saw much small negative real return rates of 0.34% and -2.8% 
respectively. Throughout the time period spanning from 1997 to 2016, the AFAP saw its greatest 
real net return rate in 2009, when it reached 29.33% just after having yielded the lowest real 
return rate of -20.91% in 2008. There are no consistencies or noticeable trends in AFAP net real 
return rates from year to year (Table 49). For example, in 2002 the AFAP net real return rate was 
14.22%, it subsequently increased in 2003 to 26.58% and then fell back down in 2004 to 5.68%. 
These inconsistent and, occasionally extreme fluctuations in return rates could be attributable to 
lack of strict investment limits, and too-frequent changes in investment portfolio structure.  
Overall, AFAPs have mostly seen periods of positive real net return rates on investments. 
While the only substantial negative return rate occurred in 2008, the private companies have seen 
three periods of average negative real return rates since 1997. In order to decrease discrepancies 
between annual real return rates, stricter investment limitations must be implemented. 
Additionally, there should be different investment structures catered to workers based on age and 
risk. Unlike Chile or Mexico, the older working population that is nearing retirement and 
contributing to an individual account, is not granted as much security when it comes to the 
management of their individual accounts as there exists no “less-risky” or “more-risky” 
management sub-funds within the AFAPs. Therefore, all workers, regardless of age and risk-
aversion, face the same risk under the post-reform second pillar system of individual accounts. 
The older working population will not have as much time as the younger working population to 
compensate for negative returns on failed, risky investments. In order to create a greater sense of 
security and financial stability of the individual account system in Uruguay, there must be 
different management funds within each AFAP that vary by risk and age so that workers receive 
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a retirement income that is at least equivalent to the contributions they made out during their 
working lives.                   
 
(Table 46. Source: FIAP, 2017) 
 
 
(Table 47. Source: FIAP, 2016) 
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(Table 48. Source: FIAP, 2016) 
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Since its inception, the post-reform pension system in Uruguay has demonstrated positive 
changes in terms of the six guiding core principles of social security. Not only has coverage 
expanded in terms of contributors to the new system but coverage of the retired population has 
also increased since 1995. This, in addition to higher real values of the average old-age pension 
will have a positive effect on the elderly population’s quality of life. Although gender equity was 
high before the reform of 1995, the levels of non-contributory pensioners has begun to equalize 
through increases in male beneficiaries. The level of female affiliates to AFAPs has also been 
rising steadily, approaching levels of perfect gender equality within the second-pillar of the new 
system. Since the reform, administrative costs have decreased, making it less expensive for 
contributors of the second pillar to have individual accounts. Overall, the reform has seen 
positive effects in coverage, gender equity, adequacy of benefits, administrative costs and social 
solidarity. Equal treatment amongst pensioners has not improved much since the pre-reform 
pension system, as the same occupational groups that were favored then continue to be favored 
now. The financial sustainability aspect of the multi-pillar system also faces challenges, and 
requires some reforming in order to minimize investment risk for older and risk-averse 









 Overall, the pension reforms that swept Chile, Mexico and Uruguay yielded positive 
results based on the six guiding core principles of social security. While all countries 
experienced higher coverage rates after the reforms, there were mixed results across countries 
with regards to gender equity, administrative costs, and financial sustainability. Every country, 
however, had a larger rate of coverage amongst the elderly population, either through the 
implementation of the new private system or the introduction of new social assistance programs, 
in the post-reform era. This demonstrates that the population targeted by old-age pensions, has 
not only benefitted from the increased coverage of the system, but also from the increased real 
values of pensions throughout the post-reform period resulting in better retirement conditions for 
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